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ARGUMENT 
I. REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS NOT ONLY 
WARRANTED BY WEBER COUNTY'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE 
ELEMENT OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT, BUT REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BY VIRTUE 
OF DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY HURTADO'S 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF STEALTHILY HANDWRITING 
DEFENDANT'S NAME, PRIOR TO TRIAL, ON THE PLAT MAP 
UTILIZED AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 AT TRIAL. 
In its Brief, Weber County argues that the trial court correctly 
denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss inasmuch as it had established 
"a prima facie case against the defendant, specifically as to the 
element of ownership of the subject property." (See Brief of 
Appellee, p. 11). Weber County's argument is seriously flawed for 
the reasons set forth below. 
"A prima facie case is proven when evidence has been introduced 
which, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party 
with the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law." State v. 
Real Property at 633 East 640 North, 942 P. 2d 925, 931 n.l (Utah 
1997) (Payne, D.J., concurring in result) (citing State v. Wood, 2 
Utah 2d 34, 38, 268 P.2d 998, 1001 (1954) (citation omitted)). 
Contrary to Weber County's standard of review stated in the Brief of 
Appellee, a determination of whether a party has established a prima 
facie case is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews 
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for correctness. See Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The appellate court, in such 
instances, typically views "the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings." Id.1 
The record reveals that the trial court substantially, if not 
exclusively, based its denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit I,2 which is the plat map that Weber County's 
counsel, Deputy Weber County Monette Hurtado, ultimately admitted 
xArguably the evidence in the instant case should not be viewed 
in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings because the 
trial court's determination that Weber County had proved a prima 
facie case was substantially, if not exclusively, premised upon 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. At the time of the trial court's ruling, it 
was unaware that the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, had been 
altered by Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado prior to trial by her 
handwriting the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the plat map. This 
also directly contravenes Weber County's argument concerning the 
standard of review that typically applies in an insufficiency of the 
evidence type of case. Furthermore, the trial court, as the record 
indicates, did not enter any written findings of fact in support of 
its ruling. In fact, the transcript of the trial court's ruling is 
essentially devoid of any verbal findings of fact in support of its 
ruling. Notwithstanding, even if the instant case is reviewed under 
a less rigorous standard of review, reversal is appropriate in light 
of the prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case. 
2After Weber County's case-in-chief, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers' 
trial counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that Weber County had 
failed to tie the charges to Defendant, and that Weber County had 
failed to establish Defendant as the property owner (R. 162, lines 4-
14, Transcript of Trial) . In the course of denying the Motion to 
Dismiss, the trial court stated, "The testimony has, in fact, been --
and is shown up there [referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that 
that particular plat [Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that can be 
challenged, clearly -- shows that the owner of this property is the 
defendant. As a result of that, the motion is denied at this point." 
(R. 162, lines 19-23, Transcript of Trial). 
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altering by handwriting the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers'' on it (R. 
369, Response ^f - Weber County to Request Nos. 3, 4, and 7 of 
Defendant's Motion For Discovery; see also Statement of Facts, Hf20-
26 of Brief of Appellant). Ms. Hurtado's action of handwriting 
Defendant's name on the plat map that she, as the prosecutor, 
utilized throughout Defendant's trial to establish the element of 
ownership for purposes of the alleged zoning and fire code ordinance 
violations, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. This prosecutorial 
misconduct, as discussed below, seriously taints Defendant's 
convictions. 
Utah appellate courts reverse on the basis of prosecutorial 
misconduct if 
the actions or remarks of the [prosecuting] 
counsel call to the attention of the [judge or] 
jury a matter it would not be justified in 
considering in determining its verdict and, if 
so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would 
have been a more favorable result. 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Span, 801 P.2d 
329, 335 (Utah 1991); State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). As shown below, this two-
part test is more than satisfied in the instant case. 
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First, by utilizing the plat map altered by herself on the 
morning prior to trial, Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado called 
to the attention of the judge a matter or item of critical evidence 
that it would not be justified in considering in arriving at 
Defendants' convictions. In fact, the record is replete with both 
the use by Ms. Hurtado of the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, 
and the testimony by witnesses at trial in reference to the Exhibit 
in the course of Weber County's attempts to prove Defendant's 
ownership of the subject property (See, e.g., R. 76-77, Transcript of 
Trial; R. 87, lines 6-14, Transcript of Trial; R. 99, lines 5-16, 
Transcript of Trial). Further, the record evinces that the trial 
court substantially, if not exclusively, relied upon Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 in the course of denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to prove the element of ownership and in ultimately arriving 
at Defendant's convictions (R. 163, lines 19-23, Transcript of Trial; 
R. 327, lines 5-8, Transcript of Trial). 
The utilization by Ms. Hurtado of the altered plat map, i.e., 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, is exacerbated by Ms. Hurtado's failure, as an 
officer of the court, to inform either the trial court or opposing 
counsel of her alteration to the trial exhibit prior to utilizing 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as evidence at trial.3 This failure underscores 
3Ms. Hurtado's alteration of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, i.e., the 
plat map, is further exacerbated by the fact that on remand she, in 
response to inquiries concerning the altered Exhibit, initially 
represented that a Kinko's employee, per her instructions, had 
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the serious nature of the prosecutorial misconduct, not to mention 
the failure by the prosecution to prove every element of the crimes 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Harman, 767 P. 2d 
567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Every element of the crime[s] charged 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence does not 
support those elements, the verdict must fail."). 
With respect to the second part of the prosecutorial misconduct 
test, the circumstances of the instant case, including the quantum of 
evidence presented at trial, establish that there is at least a 
reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the altered plat map 
utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, there would have been a more 
favorable result. See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) 
(xxxIf proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or 
remark will not be presumed prejudicial.' Likewise in a case with 
less compelling proof, [an appellate court] will more closely 
scrutinize the conduct.") (quoting State v. Seeger, 479 P. 2d 240, 241 
handwritten the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the plat map utilized 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at trial (See R. 345-46, letter from 
appellate counsel to Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado, dated 
February 13, 1996, and filed on February 20, 1996). Only upon formal 
methods of discovery and the trial court requiring Weber County, by 
way of Ms. Hurtado, to respond to Defendant's request for discovery, 
did Ms. Hurtado, as Plaintiff's counsel, admit that she had altered 
the plat map (See R. 359, letter from Ms. Monette Hurtado to 
appellate counsel, dated February 14, 1996, attached to the Motion 
for Continuance of Hearing as Attachment 2; R. 347-50, Motion for 
Discovery; R. #65-66, Order; R. 368-69, Weber County's Response to 
Defendant's Discovery Request Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's 
Motion For Discovery). 
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(Or. 1971)). As previously discussed, Weber County, in the course of 
trial, almost exclusively relied upon the altered plat map in the 
course of attempting to prove ownership by Defendant of the subject 
property (See, e.g., R. 76-77, Transcript of Trial; R. 87, lines 6-
14, Transcript of Trial; R. 99, lines 5-16, Transcript of Trial). 
Moreover, the trial court relied upon the altered Exhibit not only as 
grounds for denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
prove the element of ownership at the close of Weber County's case-
in-chief, but it relied upon the altered Exhibit as grounds for the 
ultimate determination of Defendant's convictions (See R. 163, lines 
19-23, Transcript of Trial; R. 327, lines 5-8, Transcript of Trial). 
As to the prejudice part of the prosecutorial misconduct test, 
it is important to note that this is not a case where the prosecutor 
inadvertently or unintentionally misstated the law and the trial 
court either had or took the opportunity to cure the mistake. 
Rather, Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado, as previously 
discussed, intentionally altered the plat map by handwriting the name 
"Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the Exhibit on the morning prior to 
Defendant's trial (R. 368-69, Weber County's Response to Defendant's 
Discovery Request Nos. 1 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For 
Discovery) . Ms. Hurtado did not disclose the alteration to the trial 
court or Defendant's counsel before attempting to utilize the plat 
map as evidence at trial. On remand, Ms. Hurtado initially 
misrepresented to Defendant's appellate counsel that a Kinko's 
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employee had altered the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, per 
her instructions (R. 345-46, letter from appellate counsel to Deputy 
Weber County Attorney Hurtado, dated February 13, 1996, and filed on 
February 20, 1996). Only after a Motion For Discovery, a hearing 
before the trial court, and an Order requiring Weber County, through 
Ms. Hurtado, to respond to Defendant's discovery requests, did Ms. 
Hurtado disclose that she had in fact altered the plat map (See R. 
359, letter from Ms. Monette Hurtado to appellate counsel, dated 
February 14, 1996, attached to the Motion for Continuance of Hearing 
as Attachment 2; R. 347-50, Motion For Discovery; R. 365-66, Order; 
R. 3 68-69, Weber County's Response to Defendant's Discovery Request 
Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For Discovery). 
Because the evidence of Defendant's guilt in the instant case is 
weak, there is a presumption that the misconduct of the prosecutor is 
prejudicial. See Troy, 688 P. 2d at 486. Notwithstanding the 
prosecutorial misconduct of altering the plat map, during Weber 
County's case-in-chief, in the course of Ms. Hurtado presenting 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Weber County failed to make the requisite 
foundational showing necessary to authenticate the Exhibit as an 
accurate plat map from the Weber County Recorder's Office (See Brief 
of Appellant, pp. 3 0-31). By so doing, Weber County failed to prove 
Defendant's ownership of the subject property during the alleged time 
periods attendant to the charged crimes. In addition, Mr. Barker's 
testimony, as Director of the Weber County Planning Commission, 
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during Weber County's case-in-chief, further indicates that he 
utilized ownership books from his own office rather than those from 
the Weber County Recorder's Office to research ownership of the 
property (R. 76-77, Transcript of Trial). On cross-examination, Mr. 
Barker admitted, in contradiction to his prior testimony, that he 
actually utilized the correspondence in his file to determine 
ownership of the property (see id. at R. 84-85) , that there was 
another person in his office more qualified to answer questions 
concerning ownership of the property (see id. at R. 84, lines 22-24), 
and that he did not recall a property plat (see id. at R. 84, lines 
21-22). Further, during the State's case-in-chief, Ms. Yvonne E. 
Storey, a prior owner of the subject property, testified that, 
according to her understanding, the subject property had been 
"deeded" to Mr. Earl Chambers, Defendant's father (See R. Ill, 
Transcript of Trial). This testimony is indicative of the confusion 
that existed at trial, both on the part of the prosecution and the 
trial court, concerning the crucial distinction to be made between 
the identity of Defendant, Ronnie Earl Chambers, and his father, Earl 
Chambers (See, e.g., R. 139-41, Transcript of Trial; see also Brief 
of Appellant, Statement of Facts, Ull) -4 The confusion between 
4See Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (Letter dated June 16, 1994, from Mr. 
Glen H. Burton, Weber District Fire Chief, to Deputy County Attorney 
Hurtado, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addenda C), in which Mr. Burton represents to Ms. Hurtado that the 
subject property "is a construction equipment storage site owned by 
Earl Chambers." Mr. Earl Chambers is Defendant's father. 
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Defendant, Ronnie Earl Chambers, and his father, Earl Chambers, at 
trial is of particular significance in light of the alteration by Ms. 
Hurtado when she handwrote the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the 
plat map utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit l.5 By virtue of the 
foregoing, there existed at least a hypothesis that someone other 
than Defendant owned the subject property. The evidence at trial 
also supports the existence of the hypothesis that even if one were 
to assume that Defendant did own the subject property, that he did 
not own the property during the time periods alleged in the 
Information. The existence of these hypotheses necessarily raises a 
reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt. Consequently, the evidence 
is insufficient to support Defendant's convictions. See State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.6 
5At page 16 of the Brief of Appellee, Weber County argues that 
the Ms. Hurtado's alteration of the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, is mitigated by Defendant's trial counsel having seen the 
Exhibit prior to trial. Notwithstanding, Deputy Weber County 
Attorney Hurtado, as an officer of the court, had a duty to disclose 
her unilateral alteration of the plat map to both the trial court and 
opposing counsel prior to utilizing it as a trial exhibit. Further, 
Defendant's trial counsel reasonably relied on the representation 
that a true and correct copy of the plat map, when, in fact, it did 
not by virtue of the alteration. Finally, Defendant's trial counsel, 
even without the knowledge that the plat map had been altered, 
vigorously objected to the Exhibit based on lack of foundation 
grounds (See R. 162, lines 4-14, Transcript of Trial; R. 163, 
Transcript of Trial). 
6Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
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In its Brief, Weber County goes so far as to assert that both 
Utah case law and statutory law do not require the State to prove 
each element of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt (Id. at 
p. 12). Contrary to Weber County's assertion, uit has long been 
assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is 
constitutionally required." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 
S.Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970). Further, * [i] t is the duty of the 
Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
notion -- basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free 
society - is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in 
the historic, procedural content of xdue process.'" Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 1009 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977) ("the Due Process Clause 
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of 
the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the 
defendant is charged"). 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
required. 
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II. BY REFUSING TO RULE ON DEFENDANT'S PENDING MOTIONS, 
THE TRIAL COURT NOT ONLY FAILED TO ADDRESS ALL THE 
ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ALTERED EXHIBIT AS REQUIRED BY 
THIS COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING TEMPORARY REMAND, BUT IT 
FRUSTRATED THE JUDICIAL PROCESS BY ITS FAILURE TO 
RESOLVE THE MATTERS BEFORE IT PERTAINING TO THE 
ALTERED TRIAL EXHIBIT. 
Weber County argues that the trial court in its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order either expressly or implicitly ruled 
on Defendant's pending motions. Such a position is untenable 
inasmuch as the trial court, among other failures, completely failed 
to rule on Defendant's Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings and his 
Objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order, which incorporated the Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings 
filed on July 22, 1996.7 By so doing, the trial court both failed and 
refused to completely address the issues concerning the alteration of 
the Exhibit as Ordered by this Court on January 29, 1996. By so 
doing, the trial court frustrated the judicial process and failed to 
comply with this Court's Order concerning temporary remand (See Brief 
of Appellant, pp. 36-3 9). 
7The trial court's date of signature of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, i.e., August 28, 1996, and the file 
date stamp of August 28, 1996, of Defendant's Objection to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, which incorporated 
Defendant's Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings of Fact and the 
supporting Memorandum of Law filed on July 22, 1996, are indicative 
of the trial court's failure to rule on Defendant's pending Motions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse Defendant's convictions and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's directions as stated in its 
opinion. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and 
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional 
right to due process by requiring the State to prove all elements of 
the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, which, based on the 
facts of the instant appeal, involve issues requiring further 
development in these areas of criminal law for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /M) day of October, 1998. 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to 
be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply 
Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 28th 
day of October, 1998: 
Ms. Monette Hurtado 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
23 80 Washington Blvd. #23 0 
Ogden, UT 8^4 01 
17 
ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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